Books: Speak Peace
Reflecting on Reconciliation and Forgiveness
by Charles Villa-Vicencio

Book Reviewed
Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation.
Raymond G. Helmick and Rodney L. Petersen.
Radnor, Pa.: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001. 440 pp. $34.95 (Hardcover)


Forgiveness and Reconciliation is about what can be done to facilitate a reconciling process between estranged individuals, hostile factions within a nation, or between warring countries. John Paul Lederach suggests in the text that, "it is a paradox of sorts that human concern for and interest in reconciliation is as old as the hills and at the same time in a preinfancy stage." This important book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the complexities surrounding reconciliation. It edges us toward a level of maturity that affects personal, national, and international quests for conflict transformation and reconciliation.

A dominant paradigm in thinking about reconciliation, not least in theological circles, suggests that forgiveness precedes reconciliation. The sequence is well-known: confession, repentance, forgiveness, and reconciliation. This conventional wisdom needs to be questioned in the light of entrenched social or national conflicts. In the hard world of political conflict, initiating the peace process is more important than an ideal outcome. And, ultimately, personal reconciliation may not be vastly different. There is no reason to suggest that forgiveness should necessarily precede personal reconciliation. An emerging sense of interdependence, which requires tolerance and empathy, perhaps the beginning of a relationship— even the initial phases of friendship— is frequently the first step in any reconciling process. Indeed, most nations and individual relationships survive quite well on less than ideal or complete reconciliation, which includes forgiveness and everyone living happily ever after. Put differently, to focus on an ideal theological notion of reconciliation, rather than a more modest understanding of reconciliation as a process with limited beginnings, is both conceptually confusing and practically counterproductive.

The pursuit of a greater goal is at the same time necessary to ensure that the initial step in the process does not become the final one. A lack of movement beyond the first hesitant step in rapprochement can only serve to fuel the suspicion of the critics of political gradualism, who reject the process as little more than the rearranging of furniture on a vessel that drifts ever closer to disaster.

It is helpful to declare and be conscious of one's context and perspective. This review is written in the wake of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. I do so mindful of the fact that few of us predicted much more than disaster for South Africa in the late 1980s. The breakthrough came not as a result of any Damascus Road experience; it came as a result of a series of encounters within which protagonists on opposing sides began to make contact with one another. Tentative, fragile steps were taken that led to "talks about talks."

In the process, cautious relationships were forged. This opened the way to a search for peace and the beginning of a reconciling process.

Not every contributor to the book under review will necessarily agree with the underlying perception of reconciliation as a process preceding and ideally incorporating forgiveness. And yet all the contributions enrich the discussion on the complexity of the relationship between reconciliation and forgiveness. Anthony da Silva addresses the sequence question quite explicitly, drawing on Robert Schreiter's suggestion that a more appropriate sequence may be: "reconciliation, forgiveness, repentance." In an important contribution to the book, Miroslav Volf reminds us that there are no "autonomous and self-constituting entities" in human relations. It is through human encounter that the healing process begins. This does not suggest that repentance, justice, and other important dimensions of human relations are to be suspended indefinitely or played down in any other way. To Volf "the struggle against injustice is part of the more fundamental pursuit of reconciliation." The pursuit of forgiveness is, in a similar sense, a goal that needs to sustain the reconciliation process. It is not, however, necessarily something that must precede the process. I am arguing that it rarely does. Lederach speaks of the need for "a relationship-centric approach to reconciliation." He suggests it involves a "multifaceted journey" in pursuit of a goal not yet reached. "Reconciliation is both place, as in destination, and a journey." In the words of Ofelia Ortega, "conversion is not a momentary act of moral decision, but a process of learning and a new way of living."

The African concept of ubuntu, introduced by Audrey Chapman, suggests that a person is only a person through other persons. In the words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, it means "my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up in yours." As such, "social harmony is for us the summum bonum— the greatest good." It places dialogue and reciprocity at the center of the struggle to be fully human. It suggests that people are incomplete to the extent that they are alienated from one another. Often neglected at the height of war, rebellion, and conflict, it is this hope that inspires conflict resolution, peacemaking, and the need for coexistence. Is it an anthropological reality? A philosophy of ubuntu suggests it is. It recognizes that the process of seeking to be fully human refuses to submit to fate. It involves the creation of the kind of future that enables people to engage one another in the creation of a society that includes all others. Da Silva speaks of "a common psychological need all humans share, which is to want to live in harmony with fellow humans while minimizing the stresses and strains of conflict."

Of course this is not easy. There are numerous obstacles that undermine the process—bad memories, deep and abiding levels of hurt, the need for acknowledgment of past suffering, reparation, and justice. No one has the right to force victims and perpetrators to forgive or be reconciled. The question is whether victims and survivors can be assisted to move on—to get on with the rest of their lives, not allowing anger or self-pity to be the all-consuming dimension of their existence. It involves taking responsibility not only for their own lives and healing but also for the future direction of the nation. It is important for their own sake that those who suffered most are enabled to get on with life. This does not mean forgetting the ghastly deed. This is usually not possible and probably not helpful. It does not mean necessarily becoming friends with the person responsible for one's suffering, nor does it mean forgiving that person. Very few accomplish this. Most people can only deal with their past suffering intermittently, at times rising above it, at other times falling under its sway. Donald Shriver quotes William Faulkner: "The past is not dead and gone, it isn't even past." In da Silva's words, "no general pattern will obtain; no uniform model need or should be imposed for peoples hoping to live together." Put differently, any suggestion that confession and forgiveness is a precondition of reconciliation could be counterproductive in deeply divided societies. An approach that identifies reconciliation as process rather than goal could be more helpful. I am suggesting this pastoral approach not as an alternative to, but as an inherent part of, a viable prophetic ethic of reconciliation and forgiveness.

Editors Raymond Helmick and Rodney Petersen tell us their book is about "political penitence . . . Its horizon is not confessional, but public policy and conflict resolution." This focus makes the question of "sequence" important. In the world of politics, where "the art of the possible" prevails, the question of how to attain a given end is as important as the end itself. The means is indeed inherent to the end.

This book contains a lot of theology, offered in the service of the public square rather than the pew. Such a theology is required to explore the hindrances and potential contributions of religion to the realization of "political penitence." Volf suggests this process may be better served by more religion of the correct kind— involving "costly discipleship"—rather than less religion. This is, however, a process that may require theologians to take seriously the challenge presented to the church more than a half a century ago by Dietrich Bonhoeffer from his prison cell, which is to proclaim the gospel in secular language. Effectively this involves using language that is understood by secular society and refraining from the kind of dogmatism that seeks to prescribe how, when, and where repentance, forgiveness, reconciliation should occur. These are, after all, gracious and mysterious gifts of a gracious God.

The book is divided into four parts. The first, entitled a theology of reconciliation, addresses the theological content of key words, the dialectic of forgiveness, and theological models of reconciliation and forgiveness, in a deepening discussion on the relationship between justice, reconciliation, and forgiveness. It ends with an orthodox perspective on reconciliation and forgiveness. The contributions come from Petersen, Volf, and Stanley Harakas.

The second part, dealing with forgiveness and public policy, includes chapters by Helmick, Joseph Montville, Donna Hicks, and Shriver. The question is posed whether religion is a source of fuel or healing in situations of conflict. There is a chapter on religion and peacemaking; another on religion and foreign policy. Religion is considered in the reconstruction of identity, and the important question is asked concerning the form and nature of forgiveness in secular politics.

Part three considers the relationship between forgiveness and reconciliation. It provides diverse voices from the fields of clinical psychology, regional conflict mediation, the social sciences, and global youth ministry. The contributions are by Everett Worthington, Lederach, Ervin Staub and Laurie Anne Pearlman, and John Dawson. This is an important and action-driven section of the book that provides a number of practical ways of "reducing unforgiveness" (Worthington), discussion on "qualities of practice that lend themselves to reconciliation" (Lederach), and a focus on "healing, reconciliation and forgiving after genocide and other collective violence," with special attention to Rwanda (Staub and Pearlman). Dawson points to several areas of concern in Western civilization that require attention in pursuit of less violence and conflict.

Part four, seeking forgiveness after tragedy, addresses specific situations of conflict. These include South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Mozambique. Specific mechanisms and ways of promoting forgiveness and reconciliation are considered within these situations and more generally. These include truth and reconciliation commissions, a two-track diplomacy methodology, a Gandhian approach to reconciliation, and a Christian notion of conversion (metanoia) as means of peacemaking. In an afterword, George Ellis explores the concerns raised in the book that apply to personal, regional, national, and international life. In the foreword, Archbishop Tutu provides the inspiration that keeps the debate going.

An important message of this book is that there are no neat and tidy formulas that make for forgiveness and reconciliation. Lederach's word is an important one: "unlike other areas of conflict management more narrowly defined, reconciliation processes do not lend themselves to reductionist techniques . . . Qualities of practice point us less in the direction of technique and more towards attitude and character." The consideration of reconciliation techniques is imperative, talk about reconciliation is important, and the identification of lessons learned from reconciling initiatives is essential. This is what makes this particular book such an important one. And yet who, one must ask, is ultimately in a position to define the meaning of reconciliation for another or to prescribe the techniques of the process?

Ultimately the Spirit blows where it wills, and reconciliation happens in different ways in different places. Vigilance is required in order to discern the possibilities of reconciliation where and when they occur. Wortherington's careful analysis of mechanisms that lead to the "reducing of unforgiveness" and that promote reconciliation and forgiveness can only facilitate such discernment. Equally important is the insight provided by Joseph Montville into the "psychological man" and the "religious man." He speaks of the separation of consciences in Nazi doctors, "the half that accepted systematic murder and the other half that enjoyed a quiet evening at home with wife, children and dog"—posing the important question concerning the societal and personal causes of perpetration.

Indeed, this is frequently a key ingredient to the reconciliation process. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was mandated to do more than account for who did what to whom. It was required to discern the "causes, motives and perspectives" of perpetrators. The aim of this requirement was not to lessen the culpability of perpetrators. It was rather to identify these factors with a view to ensuring that their reemergence in the future is at least minimized, if not eliminated. The most effective way to counter gross human rights violations is, of course, through prevention. It is here that the present anticipates the future. And it is here that reconciliation work needs to begin.

The discernment of causes, motives, and perspectives can also affect the attitudes and behavior of victims and survivors. Without condoning or justifying the behavior of perpetrators in any way, in some instances it enables victims and survivors to begin to see perpetrators as victims of a different kind—of propaganda, religious indoctrination, fear, disillusionment, and a culture of submission. Madame de Staël, the late eighteenth century French intellectual, suggested that "to understand all is to forgive all." Understanding does not, of course, necessarily lead to reconciliation. It may even aggravate the sense of anger and alienation. And yet, when the story of a perpetrator is thoughtfully told, empathetically heard, and deeply understood, it can soften the perception the victim, survivor, or observer has of the perpetrator concerned. It can open a space for the possibility of a new kind of interaction between adversaries. Jozef Garlinski, a Polish underground fighter who survived Auschwitz, tells of the horrendous evil he both witnessed and suffered. He ends his account by saying, "please remember those young SS officers could have been your sons or mine." In understanding the perpetrator, we may begin to understand the forces that make for evil. We discover the power of these forces, and we begin to realize that the enemy—the German, the Serb, or the white Afrikaner—does not have a monopoly on moral insanity. We discover that maybe there is a little perpetrator in each of us. This makes unconditional negative judgment of another a little more difficult. As such, it can create a basis for interaction in the present that could lead to a new kind of future.
Second Opinion #11 Cover © 2004 by Park Ridge Center
Second Opinion #11

Publisher: Park Ridge Center, Chicago
Date: April, 2005.
ISSN: 0890-1570
105 pages.
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